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THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON CHARITABLE GIVING: A 1989 PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
The purposeofthis paperisto examine thepredicted effects oftax
reform in the 1980s (the tax acts of 1981 and 1986) on charitable
contributions by individuals and to conpare them to the actual and apparent
effects,viewed from the perspective of 1989. The paper discusseswhatthe
economic modelscanand cannot be expected to do. Then, using publisheddata
from tax returns, the paper comparesactualand predicted changes in giving as
a result of both of themajor taxreform acts. The paperconcludesthat the
changesin contributions are quite consistent with the economic model of
giving. As a result of these tax changes, average giving in high income
classes declined. These results imply that tax policy should continue to be
considered one important determinant of the level of individual charitable
contributions.
Charles T. Clotfelter




Durham, NC 27706It is really going to be devastating to charitable giving.
Bob Smucker, Independent Sector, August, 1986, about
the new tax bill.
In 1988 individuals in the United States contributed an estimated $87 billion to tax
exempt nonprofit organizations, including churches, community chests, museums, and colleges.
l'his amount was more than seven times the total given by corporations and through bequests.
Although not a large number in relation to total tax revenues, charitable contributions loom
large for the nonprofit sector, which has come to depend on such giving as a major source of
revenue. As debate over tax reform intensified during the 1980s, influential spokesmen for
nonprofit organizations came to view such reform as a serious threat to that source of revenue,
a view that was bolstered by economic models of charitable giving. Finding it uncomfortable to
oppose tax reform itself, the nonprofits nevertheless fought to maintain tax incentivesfor giving,2
with the result that the treatment of charitable contributions provided some of the gloomiest
predictions and most heated debate among the provisions involved in taxreform during the
1980s. There were many doubters who thought the sector's jeremiads amounted to little more
than crying wolf.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the predicted effects of tax reform in the 1980s
on charitable contributions by individuals and to compare them to the actual and apparent
effects, viewed from the perspective of 1989. The first section of the paper presents a
description of the issues and tax provisions relevant to charitable contributions. Thesecond
section focuses on specific characteristics of the models used to predict the effects of tax reform
on contributions and asks whether the predictions were in fact warranted by themodels and
indeed how one would test the models. The paper's third section describes several approaches
that can be used to assess the models and data that can be employed for that purpose, and the
fourth section compares predicted with actual changes in contributions during the 1980s. The
final section draws conclusions from the analysis.
I. The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions
The federal tax code accords special treatment to most nonprofit organizations, including
exemption from corporate income taxation. For a large subset of nonprofit organizations, it
also allows individuals (as well as corporations and estates) a tax deduction for the donations
they make to these organizations. The charitable deduction in the income tax, by virtue of the
preponderant importance of donations by individuals, is the most important of these deductions.
Applying only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions, it is certainly one of the oldest
personal deductions in the tax code) having existed almost as long as the income tax itself. An3
important effect of this provision is to lower an individual's net cost of making gifts. For
example, a taxpayer subject to a marginal tax rate of 30 percent who is able to deduct a
contribution of $100 will enjoy a tax reduction of $30, thus reducing the after-tax net cost of
the contribution to $70. The taxpayer can be thought of as receiving a discount on the price of
making gifts; the deduction reduces the net cost of donating a dollar to 70 cents. State income
tax deductions reduce this net cost further, though data on state tax rates are typically not
available and thus are usually ignored in statistical analyses.
There is an additional benefit of making contributions in the form of appreciated
property such as stock, real estate and objects of art. Donors of such gifts not only receive the
tax deduction for the asset's current market value, typically they also avoid paying tax on the
capital gains that would otherwise have been associated with the sale of the asset. For
example, if the gift described above had not been cash, but rather $100 of stock that had
originally been purchased for $50, the tax code's forgiveness of the tax on the capital gain of
$50 would further reduce the net cost of giving if the stock would otherwise have been sold. If
the capital gains tax were 20 percent, for example, the taxpayer would save an additional $10
that would otherwise have been due had the stock been sold, reducing the net cost of the gift
to $60, or 60 cents per dollar. As above, these calculations generally apply only to taxpayers
who itemize their deductions.
As a result of this tax treatment, the net cost of contributions comes to depend crucially
on two factors: first, tax rates and, second, how widespread the deductibility of gifts is. In
general the latter equates to the proportion of taxpayers who itemize their deductions, which
depends in turn on the size of the standard deduction and the number and size of other
itemized deductions.4
B. Tax Reform in the 1980s
Each of the two major tax bills of the 1980s contained provisions that affected taxpayers'
net cost of making contributions, and the most important of these are summarized in Table 1.
The 1981 act (the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981) modified the tax rate schedule by
cutting the top marginal tax rate, from 70 to 50 percent and reducing other tax rates
proportionally. At the same time the act failed to adjust the tax tables for inflation, thus
allowing taxpayers to slide into higher tax brackets and largely nullifying the cut in rates for
most people. The cut in the top rate of course meant an increase in the net cost of giving for
those with high incomes. Working in the other direction was the likely increase in the number
of itemizers that would result from a fixed standard deduction during a period of inflation.
Surely the most obvious provision likely to affect contributions was a new charitable deduction
for nonitemizers that was to be gradually phased in between 1982 and 1986. However, only in
1985 and 1986, when the very low dollar limits on this deduction were removed, was it likely to
have an important effect on contributions.
The 1986 act (the Tax Reform Act of 1986) likewise contained several important
changes having implications for charitable contributions. First, it continued the work of the
1981 act in cutting the top tax rate. The highest marginal tax rate was reduced to 33 percent
for 1988, and taxpayers in the highest income brackets faced a rate of only 28 percent. Tax
rates were not cut for all taxpayers, however. Hausman and Poterba (1987) estimate that only
59percentof taxpayers saw their marginal tax rates decrease as a result of the new law.
Second, the nonitemizer deduction was eliminated from the code after being fully in place for
one year. Third, the number of taxpayers who would itemize their deductions would be
reduced markedly due to increases in the standard deduction amounts, the elimination of the
sales tax deduction, and the curtailment of the personal interest and miscellaneous deductions.5
Thenet effect of these three changes was to increase the net price of giving for virtually all
taxpayers either by removing deductibility of gifts or reducing the value of the deduction for
those who continued to itemize. A fourth important change related to charitable giving was
made in the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), a provision applying only to a comparatively
small number of very wealthy taxpayers. To the existing list of "tax preference" items in the tax
base of the AMT was included the heretofore untaxed appreciation of donated capital assets.1
As discussed below, the effect of this provision was to diminish the attractiveness of giving away
assets whose basis was small in relation to market value. A fifth and less important provision
affecting contributions was the taxation of capital gains at regular rates. For taxpayers not
subject to the AMT, this provision would in fact increase the relative desirability of giving away
appreciated property since the foregone capital gains tax had increased. The 1986 act
contained a number of other provisions affecting certain kinds of donations or nonprofit
organizations more generally, but these provisions are of lesser importance for individual
contributions in the aggregate.2
Two ready measures of the impact of the two tax acts on the net cost of making
contributions are shown in Table 2. The table shows that the proportion of taxpayers who
itemized their returns increased steadily over the period in which the standard deduction was
not adjusted for inflation. From 31 percent, the share of itemizers rose to 40 percent before
being cut back to 30 percent by the large jump in the standard deduction contained in the 1986
act. The last column in the table chronicles the decline in the tax code's highest rate bracket.
For a taxpayer subject to that rate, the cost of making cash donations more than doubled, from
30 to 67 cents per dollar. For those subject to the 28 percent rate in 1986, it increased even
more.6
II. Assessing the Impact on Charitable Giving
A. Models of Charitable Giving
In the decade between 1975 and 1985 there appeared at least a score of empirical
studies of charitable giving based on a common basic economic model of giving. As developed
by Feldstein (1975) and modified in subsequent studies, this basic model takes charitable
contributions to be a function of after-tax net income (Y), the tax-defined price of contributions
(P), and other factors thought to affect charitable behavior (X). Typically this relationship has
been estimated using a log-linear specification:
(1)lnG=d +alnY+blnP+cX+e,
where G is defined as contributions plus $1 or $iO, d, a and b are parameters, c is a vector of
parameters, and e is an error term. Price is defined as the dollar amount of consumption
foregone per dollar of contributions. For donors who receive no tax deduction for their gifts --
nonitemizersin most cases and all those owing no tax —thisprice is simply Si. For an
itemizer with a marginal tax rate of m, the price of making ordinary cash contributions is 1-rn,
since each dollar's worth of giving causes the person's tax liability to be reduced by Sm.
The model implies that taxes affect contributions in two ways --throughnet income and
through the price of giving. Thus almost any change in the tax rate schedule or in the number
of taxpapers who itemize their deductions will tend to have an impact on giving. It is
straightforward to use such models to simulate the effects of tax changes on charitable giving.
For example, if non-tax factors remain the same, the simple model in (1) implies that
contributions will change only as a function of changes in the tax-defined variables. Where a
and b are, respectively, the estimated income and price elasticities, the predicted level of
contributions in the second period is
(2) G1 =G0(Y1/Y0 (P1/Pg7
A similar approach can be taken with more complicated specifications. But whatever the exact
specification, it is useful to emphasize what an approach of this sort implies about charitable
behavior. It is not predicated on the assumption that taxes are the only or the major
determinant of charitable giving, but only that they are one influence. If the basic equation is
correctly specified and estimated and if non-tax factors are indeed unchanging, an equation such
as (2) can be used to predict the effects of tax changes. It is important, however, to consider
several issues that complicate the use and interpretation of this simple modeL
Estimated elasticities. The simple model given in (1) implies constant elasticities of
contributions with respect to both the tax-defined price of giving and net income. Typical
estimates for the price elasticity are greater than one in absolute value, which implies that
contributions would fall by more than 10 percent in response to an increase in the net price of
giving of 10 percent. The income elasticity has most often been estimated to be positive but
less than one. In the present paper, I use estimates presented in aotfelter and Steuerle (1981)
to be representative of the empirical studies on this subject: -1.27 for the price elasticity and
0.78 for the income elasticity. The literature on this subject is not unanimous regarding the
size or the constancy of these important parameters, however. There is some evidence, for
example, that the elasticities differ by income level, with low-income households being less
responsive to changes in price than others. And there are a few studies that suggest that both
price and income elasticities are quite a bit smaller in absolute value than the majority of
studies indicate.4 In order to reflect these alternative views of charitable giving behavior, the
current paper compares the predictive success of the simple constant elasticity model using the
above parameters with a variable elasticity model estimated in Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981) as
well as a model that incorporates price and income elasticities of zero.8
Gifts of appreciated property. In the past it has usually been advantageous for donors
to make gifts in the form of appreciated property, such as stock, real estate and works of art, as
opposed to giving the same amount in cash, no tax being assessed on the capital gain that
would have arisen had the asset been sold. This additional benefit is added to the value of the
charitable deduction itself to make the net cost of giving such assets even less than that for
giving cash. Because gifts of appreciated property are an important part of contributions for
some types of donee organizations and among wealthy taxpayers, it is important to consider
what this tax treatment implies for the price of giving. Where g* is an asset's gain-to-value
ratio in the year it is given away, n is the tax rate on capital gains income, and R is a
dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if the asset would have been sold
immediately if it were not contributed and 0 if the asset would not otherwise have been sold,
the net cost of contributing the asset is
(3) P=1-m-Rgn.
Note that in the case of an unappreciated asset such as cash, this expression reduces to the 1-
m used above.5 As noted above, the 1986 tax reform act modified this traditional treatment for
taxpayers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For these taxpayers, inclusion of
the appreciation portion of the gift as a tax preference placed a penalty on the gift exactly
equal to the capital gains tax that would have been due had the asset been sold. For a
taxpayer who would have otherwise sold the asset, this penalty was equivalent to reducing the
gift's benefit to that of giving cash.'
It is important to give attention to gifts of appreciated property for two reasons. First,
this tax treatment ought to be integrated into simulations of the impact of tax reform just as it
has been integrated into empirical studies of the impact of tax policy on contributions.
Accordingjy, the calculations given below calculate the price variable as a weighted average of9
the prices of giving cash and appreciated property. Following earlier work, the calculations use
weights based on the proportion of contributions made in the form of cash in the initial yearof
observation. The price of giving appreciated property is calculated assuming an asset with a
gain-to-value ratio of 50 percent that would have been sold immediately (Rg* =0.5). A
second reason for being attentive to gifts of appreciated property is their potential to reveal
another facet of the economic model of giving, If the relative price of making cash and non-
cash gifts vanes over time, the economic model of giving would suggest that the pattern of
giving would also vary accordingly.
To see what kinds of implications the model would have for tax changes in the 1980s, it
is useful to examine the calculated net price for two specific cases. Since the tax circumstances
of the wealthy were affected most dramatically, I present cases applying to high-income
taxpayers. Table 3 shows the price of giving in three years for a hypothetical couplewhose real
AG! remained at $1 million in 1985 dollars over the period. This couple's marginal tax rate
would have been cut sharply as a result of tax reform during the 1980s: from 70 to 50 percent
by the 1981 tax act and down to 28 percent by the 1986 act. The result would have been more
than a doubling in the price of giving cash, from 30 to 72 cents per dollar. For the net cost of
giving an asset which consisted of 50 percent capital gains, the price would almost have tripled.
The second example is based on an actual case which has been cited more than once as an
example of the 1986 act's supposed discouragement of gifts of art. Having inherited Vincent
van Gogh's Irises, valued then at $1.8 million, John Whitney Payson decided to sell the painting
in 1987 rather than giving it, as he had planned, to Westbrook College in Portland, Maine.
The painting sold in November 1987 for a record $53.9 million. Table 4 summarizes the tax
consequences of donating the painting under the previous tax law, the regular taxunder the
1986 law and under the AMT provisions of the 1986 law. As a result of the drop in tax rates,10
thenet cost per dollar of donating the painting under the regular tax increased by almost half
as a result of the 1986 act. But because Mr. Payson would probably have been subject to the
AMT, the price rose even more than that, from 31 to 79 cents per dollar as compared to
selling the painting immediately. Although extreme, this example suggests one implication of
the economic model of giving --thatlarge gifts in the form of appreciated property would be
particularly discouraged relative to cash and relative to gifts made before the tax act.
Dynamic elements. The simple model in (1) takes no explicit account of time. Yet it
seems reasonable that individual charitable behavior is unlikely to change overnight in response
to changes in tax law. One model of charitable giving views equations such as (1) as a
representation of the long-run or desired level of contributions. Individuals may not adjust right
away to changes in this desired level, however, due to such factors as habit or established levels
of solicitation that may be based on previous levels of giving. Applying an incomplete
adjustment model to charitable giving behavior yields a model such as
(4)G1/ G, =(GIGo)h,
whereG is the desired level of contributions and h is a coefficient of adjustment. A value of
h close to one would imply that individuals adjust completely during a time period to changes in
the desired level of contributions; values closer to zero would imply a slower response. For the
calculations made in the present paper, a value for h for a one-year period of 0.37 is used,
based on an estimate given in Clotfelter (1980, p.333). This value implies coefficients of
adjustment of 0.60 for two years and 0.84 for four.711
B. The Nonprofits' Fear of Tax Reform
Although many of the details of the economic model of charitable giving were not
widely understood, the essence of the price responsiveness argument did find its wayinto the
debate over tax reform. Lobbyists for nonprofit organizations cited econometric models in
warning of possibly harmful consequences of tax changes while proponents of tax reformraised
questions about the models being used. That such a seemingly esoteric pieceof economic
reasoning would become part of policy debate may seem surprising, but there wereseveral
factors that worked in its favor. Among these were the amount of attention that had been paid
to tax effects on giving by the prestigious Filer Commission in the 1970s, the prominenceof the
economist (Martin Feldstein) who undertook econometric work under the Commission's
sponsorship, the relatively large number of confirmatory studies that followed the first work,and
the easily overlooked fact that the conclusions of the economic studies generally resonated with
the everyday experience of many people. The models served to lend specificity to the vague
worries of nonprofit organizations about how tax reform might affect them.
Among the features of tax reform plans that were discussed during the 198(, there
were two that most worried leaders of nonprofit organizations. First, any drop in thenumber
of taxpayers who received a charitable deduction was, understandably, seen as a threat to
contributions. Not only was the nonitemizer deduction subject to a sunset provision after 1986,
but many of the tax reform plans discussed, including the eventual 1986 act, would have
reduced the number of taxpayers who itemized their deductions. The second source of concern
was a feature common to all of the tax reform plans --ratereduction. Although few were
prepared to speak out against rate reduction, it was not hard to believe that the taxincentive
for giving a gift under a 28 percent marginal tax rate, for example, would be a lot less than
what existed under the previous 50percentrate. In terms of the economic model of giving,12
both tax rate reduction and restrictions on the deductibility of gifts would raise the net cost of
making gifts, but one did not have to be an economist to guess that the outcome would be
unfavorable for nonprofit institutions. In addition to these two aspects of tax reform, a third
challenge to the nonprofits arose at the eleventh hour of the debate over the 1986actin the
form of an attack on the tax-free status of capital gains in gifts of appreciated property.
Representatives of the nonprofit sector were quick to respond to major tax reform
proposals, using economic models of giving to provide specific estimates of likely impacts. In
response to the Treasury's first tax reform plan in 1985, Independent Sector, an umbrella group
representing nonprofit organizations, criticized that plan's elimination of the nonitemizer
deduction and its introduction of a floor for itemized charitable donations, saying that
contributions would drop by 20 percent if the plan were enacted.9 Likewise, spokespersons for
the nonprofit sector criticized President Reagan's May 1985 tax proposal, which also eliminated
the nonitemizer eduction. They publicized estimates that the proposal would cause
contributions from individuals to drop by $10 billion.1° When the details of the tax act itself
were finalized in the summer of 1986, the story was much the same. Nonprofit representatives
quoted research suggesting that the number of itemizers would decline as a percentage of all
taxpayers from 38 to 20 percent under the new law." Given certain caveats, models implied
that contributions under the new law would be on the order of 14 to 16 percent lower than
under the previous law.' Because of its special provisions affecting colleges and universities
and gifts of appreciated property, those who spoke for arts and educational institutions were
especially concerned about the bill's negative impact.'313
HI. A aoser Look at the Models
Before considering in detail the predicted and apparent effects of tax reform on
charitable giving, it is useful to take a closer look at the economic model and some of its
implications.
A. Using the Economic Model: Simulations, Limitations and Caveats
When a simplified model is applied to real-world policy analysis, caveats are usually in
order, and this is certainly the case with models of charitable giving. Since behavioral equations
such as (1) do not even purport to capture all of the factors that influence donative behavior,
the analyst is well-advised to be carefuL in applying estimated parameters in simulating the likely
effects of policy changes and modest in describing the validity of projections. Such care and
modesty seldom come naturally, however, and they are furthermore counteracted by the
frequent urge on the part of journalists, policymakers and lobbyists to simplify and dramatize.
In considering the policy applications of the economic modeL of contributions, it is useful to
review the justification for using estimated models to assess likely policy outcomes.
As has been common practice in a number of applied topics in tax analysis, estimated
models such as (1) have been used to simulate the likely effect of various planned or
contemplated modifications in tax policy, in this case by translating such modifications into
changes in the price and net income terms and using an estimated equation such as (2). What
can such an exercise tell us? At most, it can yield predicted levels of contributions for a
hypothetical and most likely counterfactual situation, one in which none of the other factors
contained in the vector Xchanges.Needless to say, simulations such as these are rarely
described this way in newspaper stories. Because of their counterfactual nature, such
projections tend to be inherently immune from factual verification: it is always impossible to14
eliminate the possibility that "other factors" have changed at the same time that tax policy has
changed, thus confounding any pure tax policy effect. While this may come as arelief to those
who produce such projections, it is cold comfort to analysts and policymakers who are
concerned about the actual impact of actual policies. Fortunately, it is possible to devise
indirect tests of the validity of such simulation models by examining various implications of the
model under some reasonable assumptions. Several tests of this sort are discussed below in
section B.
Besides their basic counterfactual nature, simulations based on a model such as (1) are
subject to a variety of errors, and a policy of full-disclosure requires that these be aired aswell.
These may include statistical error emanating from the imprecise nature of all econometric
estimates, errors associated with predicting such underlying variables as real income or the
proportion of taxpayers who will itemize under different tax rules, and errors arising from
ignorance of the characteristics of appreciated property that are contributed.14
There are two points on which the simulations are especially vulnerable: changes in
other factors not reflected in estimated equations and dynamic aspects of giving behavior.
"Other" factors motivating giving include personal beliefs and affiliations, aspects on which
economists are by no means expert. Survey data on charitable behavior show, for example, that
the best predictor of contributions are attendance at religious services and involvement in civic
and other organizations." To complicate matters further, it appears that issues within religious
and other organizations may have a shifting effect on giving patterns over time. Contributions
among Catholics, for exampLe, have been found to be influenced by controversy between
liberals and conservatives within the church over issues of faith.1' More generally, donations to
both religious and secular organizations appear to be highly sensitive to perceived social needs
and capable of responding quickly to crises, such as the African famine and the problem of15
homelessness in the late 198(.h7Anotherentire category of outside influence on contributions
is solicitation by charitable organizations themselves, and these efforts give every evidence of
being responsive to changes in the giving environment, including changesin tax law. For
example, Dartmouth and other universities have sent replicas of stockcertificates to alumni as
part of a reminder of the tax advantages of making giftsof appreciated stock. Charitable and
educational institutions of all kinds have increasingly turned to "direct marketing" advisors to
design solicitation campaigns.18 Factors such as these are clearly outsideof the realm of tax
policy and are moreover difficult to measure, not to mention that theireffects on giving have
not been estimated. That they change over time seems quite probable; that some actually
respond to changes in tax policy is likely. Thus the ceteris paribus assumption presents a
significant complication in the use of simulations.
The second complication relates to dynamic elements in contributions behavior.
Virtually all simulations of the effect of tax policy on charitable giving haveused as their basic
behavioral equation one that refers to long- run or desired levels of giving. While such
behavior is arguably the most important form of the response to tax policy, focusing on the long
run has the drawback of ignoring two potentially important kinds ofbehavior. First, as noted in
section II, individual giving behavior probably does not respond immediately to changes in the
desired level of giving. Second, since individuals usually have considerable latitude regarding
when they make gifts, they may time their donations so as to minimize their total tax liability.
This kind of timing might show itself, for example, in making donations early so as to have
them counted for a tax year when the taxpayer faces a comparative high tax rate rather than
the low tax rate anticipated for the following year. One might also imagine that a floor onthe
deductibiliy of contributions might inspire taxpayers to bunch their gifts, say,in alternating years
so that a higher portion of their donations would be deductible."16
B. Some Implications Regarding Tax Reform
As noted above, it is impossible to perform a definitive test of the economic model's
predictions, owing to the exclusion of other factors that affect contributions. Not only is it
difficult to predict changes in these factors, they are for the most part not even measured.
However, under a plausible assumption regarding these influences, the model does suggest
several hypotheses concerning the effect of tax reform during the 1980s. One simple hypothesis
suggested by the notion of price responsiveness in the model is that taxpayers would tend to
accelerate their giving when a decline in the tax incentive is announced for the following year.
For taxpayers facing declines in marginal tax rates between 1986 and 1987, for example, one
would expect to observe a surge of contributions in 1986 as people try to take advantage of the
high tax rates. Since there are few estimates relevant to such timing behavior, however, it is
impossible to judge the size of this effect.
A second set of hypotheses is more useful in assessing the estimated parameters of the
model. If one assumes that other factors have a uniform effect on all donations, unrelated to
changes in tax variables, one can compare patterns of variation in contributions to patterns of
variation in tax parameters and ask whether these patterns are consistent with the model's
predictions. As an illustration, there is little to be learned from observing that an individual's
contributions rose by 5percentover a period in which income rose by 4 percent and price fell
by 10 percent, for the simple reason that other factors may have changed as well over this
period. If it is assumed, however, that all individuals were affected similarly by other influences
and would have experienced the same percentage increase in giving in the absence of tax
changes, one can sensibly compare differences in the changes in tax variables and in giving.
One can then determine, for example, whether individuals with the biggest price increases also17
had the smallest increases in giving, as the model would predict. Specifically, one might expect
to see evidence useful for judging the model by looking for three kinds of effects.
1. In comparing changes in contributions over time, the model would predict bigger
declines (or smaller increases) in income classes in which the price of giving had increased the
most. In order to examine this implication, the next section presents an examination of data on
average income, price and contributions by income class over time. Since the1986taxact (and
the 1981 act as well) cut tax rates the most at upper income levels, the model would predict
that contributions by the wealthy would decline relative to contributions at middle and lower
income levels, holding constant changes in income. But changes in after-tax income would also
be predicted to affect giving. Both effects can be incorporated into the model to yield
predicted changes in giving, and the pattern of predicted changes can be compared to the
pattern of actual changes.
2. In the aggregate, changes by income class such as these would add up to a
redistribution of contributions between the wealthy and the rest of the taxpaying public. If the
income distribution did not change, the implication of these changes is that the share of total
giving by the rich would decline. If the income distribution did change, one would still expect
that contributions by the rich, relative to their income, would decline as a result of tax reform.
A corollary effect would be that organizations traditionally supported by the rich, such as
cultural and educational institutions, would suffer in comparison to those institutions
traditionally favored by the middle and lower income groups, particularly religious organizations.
These implications assume, again, that other factors affecting contributions had a similar
influence at all income levels and that shifts in the distribution of income did not offset the
pattern of changes in tax incentives.18
3.A third implication of the model applies to one specific provision, the charitable
deduction for nonitemizers. Between 1985 and 1986 that provision changed dramatically,
increasing from a 50percentdeduction to a full deduction. For a nonitemizer facing marginal
tax rate m, this change would have caused the net price of giving to fall from (1-O.5m) to (1-
m), implying an increase in contributions.
IV. Evidence on the Impact of Tax Reform on Contributions
There is no reliable measure of total charitable contributions by individuals. Tax returns
normally contain information for itemizers only, and estimates based on the receipts of
nonprofit organizations is approximate at best, largely because there is no good information on
giving to religious organizations. This data limitation plus the conceptual difficulties regarding
non-tax effects discussed above make it impossible to devise definitive tests of the efficacy of
economic models of contributions. However, one can gain insight from looking at the
aftermath of the tax reform acts of 1981and1986. The current section examines, first,
information from recipient organizations and, second, data from tax returns.
A. Evidence from Donees on Contributions
Probably the most consistent message contained in articles reporting trends in charitable
giving in recent years is that, despite charities' fears regarding the effects of tax reform,
contributions have continued to increase year after year. The widely quoted Giving USA has
reported increases in aggregate donations each year for the past 37 years, with the total rising
from $80 billion in 1985 to $98 billion in 1987 to $104 billion in 1988, increases well above the
rate of inflation. (Unfortunately, the largest component of these figures, an estimate of the19
giving of individuals, is based largely on personal income and incorporates no direct evidence on
charitable giving until several years after the fact.) Corroborating the figures for the most
recent years, articles on individual charities suggest that most had increases in contributions
between 1986 and 1987 and between 1987 and 1988.
For example, a group of 27 Protestant denominations, representing some 30 percent of U.S.
church membership, reported a 3 percent increase in gifts between 1986 and 1987, the first year
following the 1986 tax reform. Similarly, an informal survey of charities the next year showed
that most had modest increases.2' One bellweather, the United Way, reported a 6.6 percent
increase in giving from 1986 to 1987 and a 6.9 percent increase from 1987 to l988.
Such increase,s were not universal, however. Two groups of institutions that have
traditionally relied on gifts from the wealthy, especially in the form of appreciated property, are
museums and institutions of higher education. In both cases, the 1986 act did appear to have
its predicted impact on appreciated property gifts, although the overall effect of tax reform on
them is still uncertain. For these donees, the economic model would imply two things: a surge
in contributions in 1986 relative to 1987, with a further decline in 1988, owing to the decline in
rates; and a larger dropoff in gifts of appreciated property after 1986, owing to the more
stringent treatment of such gifts in the AMT. Table 5presentssome information for both
types of institutions for years immediately before and after the 1986 act. In the case of
colleges and universities, the findings on total contributions from individuals are mixed.
Between 1986 and 1987 contributions to 16 private universities changed very little in real terms
while gifts to 23 colleges increased. In both cases, total contributions at least kept up with
inflation over the four-year period despite the decline in marginal tax rates. Gifts of
appreciated assets to these educational institutions are a different story, however, with both
groups showing large jumps in 1986, followed by declines in the following years. These declines20
are consistent with the economic model,of cqurse, but they could equally well be explained by
the October 1987 stock market crash. Perhaps a purer testof the effect of the effect of the
1986 provisions on gifts of appreciated property is provided bythe experience of art museums,
shown at the bottom of Table 5. For a group of 119such museums, donations of artwork
surged dramatically in 1986 and then fell to alevel in 1988 below that achieved in 1985, a
result that is consistent with the act's having a permanenteffect on such contributions.
B. Data from Tax Returns
A tried and true source of data for examining charitable givingis tax returns: all
itemized returns contain the dollar amount of reported contributions.The tax return data
show, for example, that total contributions by itemizers rosefrom $48.0 billion in 1985 to $54.5
billion in 1986 and then fell to $49.3 billion in 1987 (U. S. Internal RevenueService, various
years). However, this slight 3 percent increase incontributions between 1985 and 1987 (a
decline of 3 percent in real terms) was accompanied by an 11 percent decreasein the number
of itemizers. Shifts in the itemizing population thus make it difficult to assess changesin total
reported contributions. Yet tax return information is veryuseful for the analysis of giving
behavior by itemizers. Its ready availability is no doubt one of the reasonsthat there have
been relatively many studies on the impact of taxes on contributions. A possibledrawback is
the possibility that taxpayers systematically overstate their contributions, andfurthermore that
the amount of overstatement is positively correlated with marginal tax rates, butthese problems
do not in fact appear to be very severe. Subject therefore to the problemof observing the
behavior of nonitemizers and to the usual lag in the availability of data, tax returndata provide
a useful source of information for assessing the impact of tax reform.In line with the21
discussion in section 111, the remainder of this discussion examines three hypotheses derived
from the economic model of contributions.
Contributions by income class. A major effect of the tax reform acts of 1981 and 1986
was to modify rate structures, thus changing the price of giving, especially in the upper income
classes. By looking at years before and after these large changes, it is possible to compare
income classes experiencing different amounts of change in price in order to see whether the
economic model is a useful guide for predicting donative behavior. For the purpose of
assessing the impact of tax reform in the 1980s, npredictedN and actual changes in contributions
for itemizers, based on changes in income taxes and tax rates, were calculated for two pairs of
years: 1980/1984 and 1985/1987. No allowance was made in these calculations for the
relatively small number of taxpayers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax. Each income
class in the ending year was paired with the income class in the beginning year with the closest
mean AGI in constant dollars. Equations (1) and (4) were used to calculate the predicted
giving in real terms in the ending year, and the percentage change in actual and predicted
giving were then compared. Figures 1 and 2 show this comparison for each pair of years using
the constant elasticity model (price elasticity of
-.27 and income elasticity of 0.78; coefficients of adjustment equal to 0.84 for the 4-year period
and 0.60 for the 2-year period).
Figure 1 compares actual percentage changes in contributions to "predicted changes
based only on the price and income effects in the constant elasticity model. Although far from
perfect, the model does mimic the overall pattern of actual changes. Especially noteworthy are
the actual and predicted declines in average giving for high-income taxpayers. For most income
classes, contributions increased by more than the model —withits implicit assumption that
"other things" had not changed --predicted.For every class above $15,000 the predicted1')
changeis less than the actual change, sometines by wide margins. Yet there is also a certain
consistency in these errors, with both the predicted and the actual declines being the largest in
the top income classes. It is obvious from looking at the graph that in this case this version of
the economic model of giving would outperform a naive model based on the assumption that
contributions do not change in real terms, or that both income and price elasticities are zero.
But it is not obvious that it would be superior to another, somewhat less naive hypothesis that
giving varies proportionately with net income, that is, the income elasticity is one while the
price elasticity is zero.
In order to compare the performance of these various assumptions about giving
behavior, I calculated the changes in contributions that each model would imply for the 1980-
1984 period. These calculations are summarized in the top panel of Table 6.' Over this
period the weighted average of itemizers' contributions declined by about 11 percent. Because
the number and distribution of itemizers changes over time, this ligure does not measure the
actual change in contributions for all taxpayers or a specified group of taxpayers; it is rather
one summary measure of the change in contributions over the period. The fourth and fifth
columns in each row show the percentage change due to price and income changes predicted by
each modeU The sixth column shows the average percentage by which each model misses the
mark, which may be thought of as the result of changes in "other" variables unrelated to
changes in income and tax policy. The last column gives the aggregate of all errors, measured
in absolute value, as a percentage of 1984 total giving. For example, the basic constant
elasticity model predicts that changes in the price of giving between 1980 and 1984 would have
decreased total giving by itemizers by about 24 percent and that change in net income would
have been responsible for a 2 percent increase. The net of these two effects --a"predicted"
decline of 22.2 percent --andthe actual decline in giving of 10.5 percent, can be seen as a23
general shift in giving at all income levels of 11.7 percent. The remaining errors, added
together without regard to sign, amount to 10.4 percent of total giving, the lowest ratio among
the four models shown. This comparison supports the impression given by Figure 1 that the
pattern of changes in giving in response to the 1981 tax act were consistent with the economic
model: income groups facing the biggest price increases tended to show relative declines in
giving.
The same kind of comparison was performed by comparing contributions in 1985 and
1987. In order to make income definitions comparable between the two years, the portion of
capital gains income excluded from AG! in 1985 was added in calculating 1985 net incomes.
Actual and predicted changes in contributions are shown in Figure 2. In this case the other-
things-equal economic model predicts very little change in giving for the bulk of the income
classes. At the lower end of the scale, where itemizers are scarcer, contributions were
predicted to rise. At the very top, they were predicted to drop, due to the cut in the top tax
rates. As the figure shows, actual changes in giving at the lower end bounced around a good
deal, reflecting the very small number of itemizers in those income classes, though the changes
did remain positive as predicted. There was little change in giving in the middle ranges of
income. At the top, actual contributions fell by more than the amounts "predicted" by the basic
modeL This latter effect might be explained by one factor that certainly did not remain
constant over this period: the stock market, which experienced its crash in October of the
ending year of this comparison. It might also reflect the less favorable treatment of appreciated
gifts by those taxpayers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax. Again, the simple constant
elasticity model performs better than both naive models, with a gross error of 11.7 percent of
total giving?24
The distribution of contributions. Because the tax rate cuts in the 1980s were
concentrated at upper incomes, the price effects in the economic model imply that the share of
contributions accounted for by the wealthy would decline unless increases in income among the
wealthy overcame this price effect? Because data on nonitemizers are not available for most
years, it is impossible to examine how the whole distribution of giving has changed over time.
In order to confine a comparison to a portion of the taxpaying population that is primarily
composed of itemizers and also to keep a fairly constant population, I examined contributions
among itemizers who fell into the top quintile of taxpayers in terms of income in each of three
years.3° The years chosen were 1980, 1984 and 1987, years before and after the two major tax
reform acts of the 198(k In order to describe the concentration of giving, the cumulative
percentage of charitable contributions was compared to the cumulative percentage of two
variables: the number of itemizing taxpayers and their income. The degree to which
contributions are concentrated or evenly distributed can be summarized using a conventional
index of inequality. This index ranges in value from 0, representing complete equality, to 1,
representing complete concentration.3'
The first approach --comparingthe distribution of contributions to the distribution of
households --showedlittle change in the distribution of giving among the top quintile of
taxpayers. There was a slight increase in the inequality of giving among households, with the
index of inequality increasing from 034 in 1980 to 0.38 in 1984 and 1987? This contrasts with
the decrease in the inequality of giving predicted by the economic models. However, when one
compares contributions against income rather than the number of taxpayers, the distribution is
shown to have become much more equaL On this basis, the calculated index of inequality
decreased from 0.15 in 1980 to 0.13 in 1984 and to 0.08 in 1987. In other words, within the
top quintile of taxpayers, the portion of contributions given by the very wealthiest taxpayers has25
beendeclining. Relative to their incomes, these taxpayers gave less in 1987 than they did in
1980. How can these two results be reconciled? The answer is that the distribution of
adjusted gross income in this top quintile became more unequal over the period, probably
reflecting an underlying redistribution of economic income as well as the inclusion in AGI of all
capital gains. This change in measured income distribution allowed the very richest to give a
smaller percentage of their incomes but still account for approximately the same share of total
giving in the top quintile.33
The 1981 act and contributions by nonitemizers. A third implication of the economic
model of giving relates to one specific provision of the 1981 act, the special deduction for
nonitemizers. In 1985 and 1986 this deduction applied to all contributions made by
nonitemizers, the only difference being that only 50centsper dollar of contributions were
eligible in 1985 compared to 100 percent in 1986. This change generally implies a decrease in
the price of giving and thus an increased incentive to give. One might expect to see, then, an
increase in nonitemizer giving between 1985 and 1986, other things equal, as well as increases
in nonitemizer giving versus itemizer giving over that period.
Figure 3 presents a comparison of "predicted" and actual percentage changes in giving by
nonitemizers between the two years, where predictions are derived using the constant elasticity
model. Comparisons are made in this case between the same income group denoted in nominal
dollars, although income and contributions continue to be expressed in constant dollars.
Because of the small number of high-income nonitemizers, income classes above $75,000 are
not shown. One notable feature of the figure is that the model predicts quite small changesin
giving for all income classes, with most of the predicted changes being positive, owing tothe
increased rate of deductibility. The actual changes show substantial variability, but in general
the average giving for nonitemizers rises over the period, a result which is again consistentwith26
the economic model. One alternative explanation for this result is that especially generous
donors switched from itemization to nonitemization status in 1986 because of the special
deduction, having the effect of raising average giving by nonitemizers and lowering it for
itemizers. The validity of this possibility can be assessed only by examining panel data when
they become available. As shown in Table 6, the constant elasticity model again performs
better than the naive models in anticipating the pattern of changes in giving.
V. Implications
Both everyday experience and econometric analysis suggest that taxpayers' charitable
giving would be sensitive to certain kinds of changes in tax law. The 1980s featured two
significant changes in tax law that, according to the dominant economic model of contributions,
should have had a sizable impact on incentives to contribute. The purpose of this paper is to
evaluate that model by determining whether these anticipated changes actually came to pass.
The analysis yields implications that can be summarized in the form of three major points.
The first point is a reiteration of one that is made above: the economic model of
charitable giving (summarized by equation (1)) is by no means a complete model of giving.
Important non-tax and non-economic factors are excluded from the model. This fact implies, of
course,thatthere is more to charitable giving than economic factors. More to the point of the
current application, this fact implies that changes in contributions through time cannot be
predicted. Only if the other excluded factors did not change could the model be used to
predict changes in contributions. The best that the model can offer is a counterfactual
statement, or a conditional prediction, for the hypothetical case in which nothing else changed.
If the coefficients of the model are correctly estimated --howeverincomplete the model27
itself--thiskind of counterfactual statement can be a useful guide in evaluating the likely
impact of tax changes. Accurate prediction of the future, however, is not a reasonable
expectation.
A second implication arises from the comparison of simulated and actual effects of tax
reforms. It is that the economic model performs reasonably well, in the sense that the changes
in giving are broadly consistent with the model's implications. This consistency is apparent in
three observations. First of all, the surge in contributions in 1986, particularly at the highest
income levels, is consistent with the tax-sensitive timing of gifts. Second, after both tax acts,
contributions tended to fall in income classes that experienced the largest price increases. More
specifically, the basic model out-performed two naive models incorporating no price response.
A third bit of empirical support for the economic model is the apparent redistribution in
contributions among taxpayers in the highest quintile of income distribution. As predicted by
the economic model, the most affluent gave a smaller share of total contributions --relativeto
their income --followingthe two tax acts.
A third implication arises in turn from these results. Because the results are generally
consistent with the economic model, it follo that the predicted effects of tax reform based on
the economic model are worth paying attention to. In the current policy environment, several
possible changes in tax law are discussed from time to time, ranging from the reinstatementof
the nonitemizer reduction to a floor for the itemized deduction. Since these and other changes
could have large effects on the net cost of giving, they could also have a large impact on
charitable contributions.Endnotes
1. For a description of this provision and its effect on donations of artwork, see Fullerton
(1989).
2. For example, the law limited donations to private nonoperating foundations to the
asset's basis except for certain kinds of stock; it limited the deductibility of travel costs
associated with charitable deductions; it liberalized the deductibility of gifts out of inventory; it
granted certain exceptions to the unrelated business income tax; it made the income of certain
previously tax exempt nonprofits taxable; it made fellowships and scholarships taxable; it
imposed limits on the ability of colleges and universities to issue tax-exempt bonds; and it
lowered the excise tax on some foundations. For a fuller description of the act's provisions
related to nonprofit organizaitons, see Chiechi et al. (1987).
3. Because the logarithm of zero is not defined, adding a small amount to reported
contributions allows contributions to be expressed as a logarithm. This amount can be thought
of as unreported contributions.
4. For example, Glenday et al. (1986), using cross section data for Canada, obtain a price
elasticity of -0.15 for high-income donors and zero for other taxpayers. Other studies, using
first-differences calculated from panel data, also yield estimated coefficients smaller than the
benchmark estimates obtained from cross section studies. See, for example, Clotfelter (1980) or
Broman (forthcoming). There are at least three reasons why equations estimated in first
differences might produce elasticities smaller in absolute value. First, the cross section
equations could be subject to omitted variable bias. If price or income variables are
systematically correlated to personal characteristics important in determining charitable giving,the estimated price and income coefficients could beoverestimated in absolute value. Taking
first differences would mitigate that problem. A second reason whyelasticities estimated in
first-difference equations might be smaller is that giving might not respond right awayto
changes in price and income. This explanation providesthe motivation for developing a
dynamic model of giving such as that describedin the text. A third reason why the first
difference model would produce smaller coefficients is errorsin variables. Because individuals
seldom know exactly what their tax rate is, particularlyin the year in which the income is
earned and contributions made, it is quite likely that donorshave at best only an imprecise idea
of the year-to-year change in income or price, making theactual change in those variables an
error-prone estimate of the individual's ownexpected values, which are the variables more likely
to be influencing behavior.
5. SeeClotfelter (1986) for a discussion of the tax treatment of giftsof appreciated
property.
6. Where the tax rate for the Alternative Minimum Tax was 0.21,the price of giving under
the AMT was (1 -0.21-0.21Rg* +0.21g),where g is the gain-to-value ratio in the year of
the gift and g is the ratio in the year the asset wouldhave been sold. If the donor would not
have sold the asset, but rather allowed it to pass intohis or her estate, the price would
approach one as g approached 100 percent, asshown by the example given in the text. See
Clotfelter (1986, p.203).
7. Equation (2) implies in general: lnG =(1-h)tlnG0 +[1-(1-h)t]lnG.
8. One frank statement came from arts lobbyist AnneG. Murphy, who was head of the
American Arts Alliance, in the midst of final debate overthe 1986 tax reform act: "I hope it
breaks up. I hope it (tax reform) goes down the sewer. They'retrading two lollipops for apiece of mayonnaise." Judith Michaelson, "Washington Lobbyist Figures Arts Organizations
Come Away Losers," Los Angeles Times. August 19, 1986, p.V1-1.
9. "Treasury I" was a plan that would have cut rates, ended the nonitemizer deduction and
made the itemized deduction subject to a floor of 2 percent of Adjusted Gross Income. For a
description of the model used to project the 20 percent decline, see Clotfelter (1986, p.l99).
For a description of the opposition by nonproflts, see David Johnston, "Charities Plan Deluge
of Letters on Deduction Cuts," Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1985, p.'-1.
10.See Kathleen Teltsch, "Loss of Charity Deductions Would Hurt, Groups Assert,"
YorkTimes, May 30, 1985, p.1-19.
11.A study by Lawrence Lindsey is cited in Irvin Molotsky, "Charities Fear Effect of
Changes," New York Times, August 20, 1986, pJV-11.
12.Lindsey (1987, p.6'7) cited a difference of 14 percent in the long run while Clotfelter
(1987, p.14) cited differences of 15 and 16 percent, depending on the model used, comparing
contributions under the old and new tax regimes. An estimate made several years later by
Lankford and Wyckoff (1989) implied a much larger percentage difference in giving for
itemizers only, 26 percent, a prediction not necessarily inconsistent with the smaller figures
applying to all taxpayers.
13.See, for example, Clotfelter (1987), Michaelson, "Washington Lobbyist," or Anne C.
Roark, "College Students Could be Tax Losers," Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1986, p.1-16.
14.For an illustration of a fuller listing of the limitations of simulations using such models,
see Charles T. Clotfelter, '"Fax Reform and Charitable Giving in 1985," Tax Notes, February 4,
1985, p.481.15.Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 1988Edition(Washington, D.C.:
Independent Sector, 1988). For a description of the survey questions regarding attitudes and
charitable behavior, see Kristin A. Goss, "In Charitable Givng, Volunteers Lead and the
Wealthy Lag," Chronicle of Philanthropy. October 25, 1988, p.9.
16.See Peter Steinfels, "Church Message This Season: Erasing Debt by Giving More," New
York Times, November 14, 1988, p.12.
17.Africare, an organization specializing in relief operations in Africa, experienced a surge
in donations in 1987. The Salvation Army had much higher increases in donations between
1987 and 1988 than other religious organizations, which was attributed to concern over the
homeless. See Anne Lowrey Bailey, "1988's Gifts Barely Keep Pace with Inflation, but Year-
End Rise Heartens Charities," Chronicle of Philanthropy. January 24, 1989.
18.See, for example, Kathleen Teltsch, "Creative Fund-Raising Grows as Year Nears End,"
New York Times, December 23, 1985, p.'-12.
19.The standard deduction could result in similar multi-year timing behavior if contributions
represented the difference in deductions that would make itemization worthwhile. For a
detailed treatment of such behavior in general, see Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Lindsey,
"Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior: An Application to the Tax
Treatment of Charitable Contributions," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 682, 1981.
20.The variables used to estimate individual contributions include personal income, a time
trend, population, a stock market index, and an indicator of the party of the incumbent
president. For an explanation of the estimation used, see the Appendix A of Giving USA.21."Protestant Churches Saw 3-Pct. Increase in Giving Between 1986 and 1987, Survey
Finds," Chronicle of Philanthropy, July 11, 1989, p.4 and Bailey, "1988's Gifts."
22."United Way Contributions Up 6.9 Pct.," Chronicle of Philanthropy. May 2, 1989 and
personal communication from Russy Sumariwalla, United Way of America.
23.An additional limitation of tax return data on contributions is the existence of upper
limits on the deductibility of contribution. For most types of contributions, the deduction is
limited to 50 percent of AGI; any excess can be carried foward into the following five years.
The limit for gifts of appreciated property is 30 percent of AGI, and for gifts to foundations, 20
percent. Relatively few taxpayers are subject to these limits, however.
24.See Slemrod (1989).
25.Comparisons were also made for the 1980/1982 period, with very similar results to those
shown for 1980/1984.
26.One way of seeing the components of changes in contributions is to rewrite the basic
equation for an individual as
(la)GI/GC=
where all "other" factors are assumed to enter as one variable logarithmically, and E1 is a
multiplicative error term. The term (Y11Y0yh =Ais the predicted effect due to the change in
income, (PfP =Bis the comparable price effect, and the effect of shifts in the intercept
and changes in the "other" variable can be combined as=(d1/d0)(X1/X0)th.The percentage
change in giving can then be decomposed as(ib) lnG-lnG=lnA+lnB+lflC,+lflEi
If all individuals are assumed to be subject to the same proportional changes in "other"
variables, including the intercept, then ( =Cbecomes a shift parameter common to all
individuals. The extent to which a model fails to explain differences in behavior between
individuals, or income classes in the case of observations based on income classes, will be
reflected in the error term E1.
Table 6 shows weighted averages for In A and in B, along with the average value of
in C for each of several models, effectively decomposing the actual percentage change in total
giving. For example, the portion due to price is calculated as
(.. NG In A4)/( 2NGa), where i's refer to income classes.
A useful measure of the degree to which a model fails to explain all changes in giving is
the sum of absolute errors expressed as a percentage of actual giving in the second period:
(£. N,G (In E1 )I(N Ga). The measure is calculated for each model and sample
and is presented in the last column of Table 6.
27.More precisely, the second column in the table is the weighted average of the log
difference in average real contributions between 1980 and 1984, which is approximately the
percentage change. Analogously, the fourth and fifth columns are weighted averagesof the
logarithm of the implied price and income effects which are also interpreted as percentage
changes.
28.The limitations inherent in the calculations of the weighted total giving figures are worth
emphasizing. Actual total contributions by itemizers in 1987 were $49.3 billion ($46.4billion in1985 dollars). Using the 1987 distribution of itemizers as weights, the changes in actual
contributions between 1985 and 1987 imply a total giving figure of $56.3 billion in 1985,
markedly higher than the actual figure of $48.0 billion for itemizers in that year. The reason
for this discrepancy is the significant increase between 1985 and 1987 in the number of
taxpayers in the upper income classes, the classes experiencing the largest percentage decline in
giving. As noted in the text, this increase in the number of high-income taxpayers is probably
the result of changes in the distribution of economic income and the inclusion of all capital
gains in AG!. As long as data from income classes (as opposed to individual returns) are used
for such comparisons, there will be no entirely satisfactory set of weights to use for this
purpose.
29.See, for example, Clotfelter and Salamon (1982, pp. 177-180).
30.For each year, I calculated 20 percent of the total taxpaying population and based my
calculation on that group. The top income classes corresponding to this population were
identified and used for the analysis. In the income class where the top quartile began, I
weighted the class's mean values by the percentage of class members who fell into the top
quartile. The transitional income classes, with the percentage of the class falling into the top
quintile by year were: $25,000-$30,000 in 1980 (68.5percent),$30,000-35,000 in 1984 (31.8
percent), and $30,000-4O,OOO in 1987 (17.3 percent). Because the ratio of total taxpayers to
total households did not change appreciably over this period, basing the quintile calculations on
the number of households seemed appropriate. Calculations were then based on itemized
contributions, number of itemizers, and AG! for itemizers (the latter was estimated for 1987 as
the total AG! for the class multiplied by the percentage of taxpayers who itemized in eachclass). For these income classes, the percentage of itemizers was very high. For example, the
percentage of itemizers in 1987, the year with the lowest rate, was 84 percent.
31.The index can be defined by reference to a graph with the cumulative percentage of
households (or income) on the x-axis and the cumulative percentage of contributions on the y-
axis. Where A is the area between the diagonal line connecting the 100 percent points and the
curve and B is the area under the curve, the index of inequality is A I(A+B).
32.All of the indices presented in this section are calculated in the manner of gini
coefficients for Lorenz curves, If A is the area under the curie and T is the area of the
triangle under the diagonal, the index is (T.A),T. For the distribution of AG! versus
contributions, this index could take on a negative value, signifying a curve above the diagonal
and a generally decreasing percentage of income devoted to contributions.
33.The gini coefficient calculated by comparing AG! and number of itemizers for the top
quintile was 0.22 for 1980, 0.27 for 1984, and 0.31 for 1987.Table 1
Major Tax Changes in the 1980s Affecting Individual Contributions
1981 tax act (Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981)
A. Rate reductions scheduled
1982: top rate reduced from 70 to 50 percent; other rates
cut 10 percent
1983: lower rates cut 10 percent
1984: lower rates cut 5 percent
B. Charitable deduction for nonitemizers phase-in scheduled
1982: 25 percent of first $100
1984: 25 percent of first $300
1985: 50 percent with no dollar limit
1986: full deduction
1986 tax act (Tax Reform Act of 1986)
A. Change in tax rate schedule
1987: top rate reduced from 50 to 38.5percent;most rates
cut
1988: top rate reduced to 33 percent, 28 percent in highest
class
B. Standard deduction increased
C. Charitable deduction for nonitemizers dropped
D. Capital gains in gifts of appreciated property included in Alternative
Minimum TaxTable 2
Itemization Status and Maximum Income Tax Rates, 1980-1988
Percentage of Highest
taxpayers with marginal










Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income; SO! Bulletin 8 (Spring 1989); Taxpayer
Usage Study. Monthly Report, May 1989.Table 3
Impact of Tax Changes on High Income
Couple's Net Cost of Making Gifts
Net cost of giving
a dollar of (b)
Year Current value of Marginal _____________________
$1,000,000AGI tax CashAppreciated
in 1985 dollars rate (a) property
1980 770,683 70 0.30 0.20
1985 1,000,000 50 0.50 0.40
1988 1,070,144 28 0.72 0.58
(a) For each gross income, taxable income was estimated by
multiplying the ratio of taxable income to adjusted gross
income (AGI) for the corresponding AGI class in that year by
the gross income figure. Using that taxable income, marginal
tax rates were taken from the tax table for joint returns.
(b) Assuming the taxpayer is an itemizer, the price of giving cash
is 1—rn, where rn is the marginal tax rate. In general, the
price of giving assets is P=l_m_Rg*n. See text. For this
table, this price is calculated on the assumption that the
asset would have been sold immediately had it not been donated
(R=l) and that the gain—to—value ratio (g=g*) is 0.5.
S3
7/14/89Table 4
The Economics of Donating Art:
An Extreme Example
(Asset value =$53.9million; basis =$1.8million)
Regular tax, Regular tax, Alternative
1986 law 1988 law Minimum Tax
(m=.50: n=.2) (m=n=.28) (m=n=.21)
[a] Value of deduction 26,950 15,092 11,319
($l000s)
[b] Tax preference 0 0 10,941
penalty ($l000s)
[ci Foregone capital
gains tax 10,420 14,588 10,941
($l000s)
[dl Tax savings
compared to 37,370 29,680 11,319
immediate sale
(a—b+c) ($10005)
Net cost per dollar (a) if
alternative disposition were:
Eel Immediate sale 0.31 0.45 .79 (b)
(R=l)
[fi Bequest (R=0) .50 (b) .72 (b) 0.99
(a) One minus the tax savings [a—b+cI for [e] and [a—b] for[fi as a
percentage of $53.9 million.
(b) Same as giving cash.
S4
7/17/89Table 5
Contributions to Universities, Colleges and
Art Museums Before and After the 1986 Tax Reform Act
(dollar amounts in millions)
















Value of Number of
art donated artworks
(millions) donated
FY 1985 76.1 28,305
FY 1986 143.0 43,670
FY 1987 94.6 20,900
FY 1988 67.2 17,035
Sources: National Association of Independent Colleges and
Universities, unpublished data, April 30, 1989, cited
with permission: Association of Art Museum Directors,
1989 Statistical survey (New York: AAMD, 1989, p. 190).Table 6
Tax Reform and manges in Cbntributions:




Period contribu— PredictedPredicted errors asper'-
and tions price income centage of
ile(locerithrn) Mndel effect effect Shift total aivina
1980 — —. 105 onstant
1984; elasticity —.237 .015 .117 10.4
Variable
Itemizers elasticity —.335 .013 .217 22.2
zero
elasticity 0 0 —.105 19.7
Incomeelas-
ticity =1 0 .018 —.128 18.5
1985— —. 227 Onstant
1987: elasticity—.092 —.067 —.068 11.7
Variable
Itemizers elasticity —.119 —.063 —.045 12.1
Zero
elasticity 0 0 —.227 21.2
Incomeelas-
ticity=1 0 —.142 —.084 12.9
1985— .253 nstant
1986: elasticity .045 —.007 .214 14.2
Variable
Non— elasticity .022 —.004 .235 14.5
itemizers
zero
elasticity 0 0 .253 15.8
Income elas-
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